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MEASURING TORT DAMAGES FOR
LOSS OF EARNINGS WITHOUT




Nearly thirty years ago, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
ruled that damages awarded for lost earnings in personal in-
jury actions are not to be reduced by taxes which would have
been payable on such earnings had the injury not occurred.
The court reasoned that Congress intended to confer a benefit
on injured plaintiffs by exempting personal injury awards
from taxation and this benefit would be nullified if the plain-
tiff's loss was measured by after-tax earnings.'
In 1980, the United States Supreme Court rejected the rea-
soning behind the Wisconsin rule and opined that neither the
statute which exempts personal injury awards from taxation
nor its legislative history indicates that Congress intended to
confer a benefit on plaintiffs or change the measure of dam-
ages awardable for loss of earnings.2
As a result of the Supreme Court's interpretation of fed-
eral tax law, the Wisconsin rule prohibiting the use of after-
tax figures in measuring loss of earnings is a rule which has
lost its rationale and should be reconsidered. This article ex-
amines the rationale for the Wisconsin rule which requires
that gross earnings be used to measure damages awarded to
tort victims who sustain a loss of earning capacity. Conclud-
ing that the rationale is based on a now unfounded interpreta-
tion of federal tax law, the article next considers, but rejects,
the exclusion of tax evidence on other evidentiary grounds be-
* B.A., 1977, State University of New York, Buffalo; J.D., 1981, Hastings College
of the Law; Assistant Professor, Marquette University Law School. The author grate-
fully acknowledges the research assistance of George W. Bezold in the preparation of
this article.
1. Hardware Mut. Casualty Co. v. Harry Crow & Son, 6 Wis. 2d 396, 94 N.W.2d
577 (1959).
2. Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 496 n.10 (1980).
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cause such a rule would be inconsistent with other Wisconsin
case law. Finally, a proposal is presented recommending that
the Wisconsin Supreme Court determine that tort damages
awarded to restore losses of past and future earnings should be
measured by the victim's earnings net of income taxes.3
I. EXEMPTION OF PERSONAL INJURY AND WRONGFUL
DEATH AWARDS FROM TAXATION
A. Internal Revenue Code Section 104
Section 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986
provides that damages received on account of personal inju-
ries are excluded from gross income.4 The term "damages"
includes all amounts received which are based on tort or tort-
type rights.5 Such damages, therefore, include recoveries of
past and prospective loss of earnings and earning capacity
even though these earnings would have been taxable if re-
ceived in the ordinary course of the plaintiff's employment.6
Wrongful death recoveries are also excluded from gross in-
3. This article does not discuss the related issue of whether the jury should be given
instructions regarding the impact of taxation on the measurement of the award and the
tax consequences of the plaintiff's receipt of the award.
In Wisconsin, whether tax instructions are given is within the discretion of the trial
judge. Behringer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 6 Wis. 2d 595, 603, 95 N.W.2d
249, 254 (1959). In Behringer, the court said that if an instruction is given it should
state that the jury is neither to add any amount to its award nor deduct any amount
from it for federal or state income taxes. Id. at 603-04, 95 N.W.2d at 254. See Wis.
Jury Instructions-Civil 1735 (1981).
However, if the proposal recommended in this article is accepted, the jury would
have to be instructed that the damages awarded to the plaintiff for loss of earnings must
be measured by earnings net of estimated income taxes that would have been paid on
such earnings if they had been received in the normal course of employment. The jury
also should be instructed that the damages the plaintiff receives will not be subject to
taxation. The latter instruction will be necessary to prevent the jury from inflating its
award by the amount of tax it might otherwise believe would be payable on the award.
Liepelt, 444 U.S. at 497-98 (quoting Burlington N., Inc. v. Boxberger, 529 F.2d 284, 297
(9th Cir. 1975)).
In actions involving a federal claim, the jury must be instructed that damage awards
are not taxable. Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 486 (1981);
Liepelt, 444 U.S. at 498.
4. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1986), provides that gross income does not include "the
amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump
sums or as periodic payments) on account of personal injuries or sickness." Id.
5. Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (as amended in 1970).
6. I.R.C. § 61 (1986).
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come.7 For Wisconsin state income taxes, the same exclusions
apply.8
B. The Historical Impact of Section 104 on the
Measurement of Personal Injury Damages
Congress first included the exclusion for personal injury
damages in the Internal Revenue Code of 1918. 9 The exemp-
tion was enacted to remove doubt as to whether damages
awarded in personal injury actions were gross income within
the meaning of the sixteenth amendment. 10 However, since
that time, it has been established that Congress can constitu-
tionally tax any gain which would include recoveries of past
and future losses of earnings.11 Nevertheless, Congress has
never repealed or limited the scope of the exemption for per-
7. Rev. Rul. 54-19, 1954-1 C.B. 179. But cf Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32
(holding that recoveries under wrongful death acts that provide exclusively for payment
of punitive damages are taxable).
The latter revenue ruling would not apply to damages awarded for wrongful death
under Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.04(4) (West 1983 & Supp. 1986) because the statute pro-
hibits awards of punitive damages in wrongful death actions. Wangen v. Ford Motor
Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 314-15, 294 N.W.2d 437, 464-65 (1980). Only compensatory dam-
ages are recoverable under the Wisconsin wrongful death statute. Nichols v. United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 13 Wis. 2d 491, 497, 109 N.W.2d 131, 135 (1961).
8. WIs. STAT. § 71.02(2)(i) (1985-86).
9. Revenue Act of 1918, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1066. The statute excluded "dam-
ages received whether by suit or agreement on account of such injuries or sickness."
For the current statute see I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)(1986).
10. H.R. REP. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1918), states:
Under the present law it is doubtful whether amounts received through accident
or health insurance, or under workmen's compensation acts, as compensation for
personal injury or sickness, and damages on account of such injuries or sickness,
are required to be included in gross income. The proposed bill provides that
such amounts shall not be included in gross income.
Id.
The doubt existed because the Commissioner had promulgated regulations taxing
damages received for personal injuries in lawsuits or settlements reasoning that they
were like insurance proceeds. Treas. Reg. 33 (rev.) art. 4 § 25 (1918). A few weeks
later, in response to an inquiry from the Treasury Department, the Attorney General
opined that insurance proceeds were .'capital' as distinguished from 'income' receipts."
31 Op. Atty. Gen. 304, 308 (1918). The Commissioner then reversed his earlier position
and held that insurance proceeds were not taxable as income and that personal injury
damages also were excluded from gross income. 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 457 (1918);
Nordstrom, Income Taxes and Personal Injury Awards, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 212, 222-23
(1958).
11. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 430 (1955).
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sonal injury damages which replace lost earnings. 12 From
these facts, several courts inferred that Congress intended to
confer a benefit on victims of personal injuries by exempting
damages they receive from taxation. To preserve this per-
ceived benefit and prevent defendants from using it to their
advantage, these courts held that personal injury awards for
loss of earnings must be measured by the plaintiff's gross
(before tax) earnings. 13
II. THE WISCONSIN RULE AND ITS RATIONALE
In 1959, Wisconsin joined the jurisdictions using gross in-
come to estimate personal injury awards for lost earnings. In
Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. v. Harry Crow & Son, la the
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that awards for loss of earn-
ings are not to be reduced by the amount of tax the plaintiff
would have paid if he had received his earnings in the ordi-
nary course of his employment.1 5 The court adopted the fol-
lowing quotation (without further explanation) as the
rationale for the Wisconsin rule:
"It is a general principle of law that in the trial of a lawsuit
the status of the parties is immaterial. Thus, what the plain-
tiff does with an award, or how the defendant acquires the
money with which to pay the award, is of no concern to the
court or jury. Similarly, whether the plaintiff has to pay a
tax on the award is a matter that concerns only the plaintiff
and the government. The tort-feasor has no interest in such
question. And if the jury were to mitigate the damages of
the plaintiff by reason of the income-tax exemption accorded
him, then the very congressional intent of the income tax
12. Damages attributable to, but not in excess of, medical expenses that the tax-
payer deducted in prior taxable years must be included in gross income. I.R.C. § 104
(1986); see also I.R.C. § 213 (1986).
13. Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 Ill. 2d 135, 151-52, 125 N.E.2d 77, 86 (1955);
Briggs v. Chicago Great W. Ry., 248 Minn. 418, -, 80 N.W.2d 625, 635-36 (1957);
Louissaint v. Hudson Waterways Corp., 111 Misc. 2d 122, -, 443 N.Y.S.2d 678, 682
(Sup. Ct. 1981); Hardware Mut. Casualty Co. v. Harry Crow & Son, 6 Wis. 2d 396,
407-08, 94 N.W.2d 577, 582-83 (1959); cf. Haynes v. United States, 353 U.S. 81, 84-85
n.3 (1957) (applying its holding to health insurance benefits); Epmeier v. United States,
199 F.2d 508, 511 (7th Cir. 1952) (applying its holding to health insurance benefits).
14. 6 Wis. 2d 396, 94 N.W.2d 577 (1959).
15. Id. at 407-08, 94 N.W.2d at 582-83.
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law to give an injured party a tax benefit would be
nullified." '16
On its face, the rationale provides two separate reasons for
the Wisconsin rule: (1) the immateriality of the tax conse-
quences the plaintiff sustains by reason of the receipt of dam-
ages and (2) the need to preserve the benefit Congress
intended to confer on plaintiffs by enacting the exemption for
personal injury awards. On closer scrutiny, the first reason
(immateriality) is a conclusion drawn when the tax exemption
of damages is considered to be a benefit Congress has con-
ferred upon a tort victim which falls within the scope of the
collateral source rule. The continuing validity of both reasons
therefore depends upon a resolution of a federal tax law issue.
The issue contemplated is whether Congress enacted the ex-
clusion for personal injury damages in order to confer a bene-
fit on injured parties, thereby requiring that gross earnings be
used to measure the amount of damages the defendant must
pay, rather than after-tax earnings which would be the appro-
priate measure if the general theory of damages is followed.17
A. Taxation and the General Theory of Damages
The relationship of taxes to damages is readily apparent
when the general theory of damages is considered. In Wiscon-
sin, damages are ordinarily awarded to compensate a plaintiff
16. Id. at 407, 94 N.W.2d at 582-83 (quoting Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 Ill. 2d
135, 151-52, 125 N.E.2d 77, 86 (1955)).
17. Hardware Mut. is the only Wisconsin case that specifically addresses the rela-
tionship of the exclusion for damages and the measurement of tort damages. There are
no cases in Wisconsin addressing the issue of whether the Hardware Mut. rule applies to
the measurement of wrongful death recoveries for pecuniary loss. However, the Hard-
ware Mut. rule is probably applicable since the amount of support and property accu-
mulations which the plaintiff may recover in a wrongful death action is derived from the
deceased's estimated loss of earnings. Maloney v. Wisconsin Power, Light & Heat Co.,
180 Wis. 546, 548-49, 193 N.W. 399, 399-400 (1923); Belstner v. Town of Sumner, 157
Wis. 556, 559-60, 147 N.W. 1072, 1073 (1914); Castello v. Landwehr, 28 Wis. 522, 532
(1871); see also Wis. Jury Instructions-Civil 1860 (1981).
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.04(4) (West Supp. 1986), provides: "(4) Judgment for
damages for pecuniary injury from wrongful death may be awarded to any person enti-
tled to bring a wrongful death action. Additional damages not to exceed $50,000 for
loss of society and companionship may be awarded to the spouse, children or parents of
the deceased."
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for losses sustained as a result of a defendant's tort. 18 To
quantify the plaintiff's loss, it is necessary to consider the pur-
pose to be achieved by the award of damages. Professor Mc-
Cormick states in his treatise on damages: "In a case of tort
... the general purpose of compensation is to give a sum of
money to the person wronged which, as nearly as possible,
will restore him to the position he would be in if the wrong
had not been committed." 19
In other words, the damages awarded to a plaintiff who
sustains a loss of earnings should place the plaintiff in approxi-
mately the same economic position he would have been in if
he had received his earnings in the normal course of his
employment.
Since earnings received in the normal course of employ-
ment are subject to taxation, the true and realistic measure of
the amount of economic loss the plaintiff suffers when the
stream of earnings is terminated or diminished is necessarily
the plaintiff's after-tax earnings. An award of damages that
approximates the plaintiff's gross earnings would place the
plaintiff in a better economic position than he would have
been in if he had been able to continue his regular employ-
ment. Therefore, taxes the plaintiff would have paid if the
plaintiff had not been injured by the defendant are highly rele-
vant to the measure of damages to be awarded to the plaintiff.
Such taxes must be taken into account to determine what
amount will restore the plaintiff to the same economic position
the plaintiff would have been in if the defendant's wrong had
not been committed.20
In contrast, the tax treatment of the damages the plaintiff
receives is irrelevant to the amount of damages awarded to the
plaintiff unless a tax is imposed on damage receipts as a result
of the defendant's tortious conduct. Since no tax is imposed,
taxation of damage awards need not be considered unless the
tax exemption accorded to personal injury damages is consid-
ered to be a benefit that Congress has conferred upon the
18. Fee v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., 17 Wis. 2d 364, 365, 117 N.W.2d 269, 270
(1962) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 466 (4th ed. 1968)), rev'd on other grounds,
99 Wis.2d 136, 299 N.W.2d 226 (1980).
19. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 137, at 560-61
(1935).
20. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1983).
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plaintiff which falls within the scope of the collateral source
rule.
B. Collateral Source Rule
In Hardware Mutual, the Wisconsin Supreme Court did
not mention the collateral source rule by name. However, the
language used by the court in support of its holding bears a
striking similarity to the language found in the leading Wis-
consin case on the collateral source rule. Thus, the holding in
Hardware Mutual may be a conclusion drawn from applica-
tion of the collateral source rule. In Campbell v. Sutliff,2 the
leading case on the collateral source rule, the defendant con-
tended that insurance payments the plaintiff received pursuant
to an accident insurance policy reduced the loss the plaintiff
sustained and should, therefore, decrease the plaintiff's recov-
ery. In response, the court stated that "such insurance...
ought not to inure to the benefit of the defendant. The only
parties interested in such a contract of insurance are the plain-
tiff and the insurer. ' 22 Similarly in Hardware Mutual, the
court held that "whether the plaintiff has to pay a tax on the
award is a matter that concerns only the plaintiff and the gov-
ernment. The tort-feasor has no interest in such question. '23
The similarity of these statements indicates that the court may
have been relying on the collateral source rule when it held
that the defendant's liability is not to be reduced by reason of
the plaintiff's tax savings. However, as the following analysis
demonstrates, for the tax exemption of injury damages to fall
within the scope of the collateral source rule, the exemption
must be considered a benefit Congress has conferred upon the
plaintiff by mandating that gross earnings be used to measure
a plaintiff's loss of past and prospective earnings.
The collateral source rule provides that a tortfeasor's lia-
bility for losses caused by wrongful conduct is not reduced by
compensatory payments or benefits the victim receives from
third parties.2 4 Wisconsin has extended the collateral source
21. 193 Wis. 370, 214 N.W. 374 (1927).
22. Id. at 375, 214 N.W. at 377 (citing Gatzweiler v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light
Co., 136 Wis. 34, 39, 116 N.W. 633, 634 (1908)).
23. Hardware Mut., 6 Wis. 2d at 407, 94 N.W.2d at 582-83 (quoting Hall v. Chi-
cago & N.W. Ry., 5 Ill. 2d 135, 152, 125 N.E.2d 77, 86 (1955)).
24. Payne v. Bilco Co., 54 Wis. 2d 424, 433, 195 N.W.2d 641, 647 (1972).
[Vol. 70:210
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rule to cover not only insurance payments received by tort
victims, but also gratuitous and contractual wage payments2 5
as well as medical services provided without charge to the vic-
tim by third parties, including governmental entities.2 6
Although these payments and benefits reduce the loss the tort
victim actually sustains as a result of the tortfeasor's conduct,
they do not reduce the amount the plaintiff may recover from
the defendant. The defendant's liability is the same whether
or not the plaintiff's losses are compensated or diminished by
benefits conferred by collateral sources.
For example, in Wisconsin the plaintiff is entitled to re-
cover the reasonable value of medical costs reasonably re-
quired as a result of injuries infficted by the defendant. The
measure of the plaintiff's recovery is reasonable value, not
what is actually charged. The same measurement is used even
if medical services are provided to the plaintiff free of charge.
Thus, the plaintiff recovers the reasonable value of the medical
services he receives even though the plaintiff will not bear the
cost of those services. The collateral source rule affords the
plaintiff this recovery. 7
The collateral source rule is inconsistent with the compen-
satory theory of damages because it permits the plaintiff to
recover damages from the defendant even though the plain-
tiff's loss has already been restored by benefits bestowed upon
the plaintiff by third parties. Nevertheless, overcompensation
of the plaintiff resulting from application of the collateral
source rule is considered necessary, or perhaps is tolerated, for
two reasons. The additional damages awarded to the plaintiff
have a penal effect on the tortfeasor because they burden the
defendant with the loss the plaintiff would have sustained if he
had received no collateral benefits. Also, the additional dam-
ages prevent the tortfeasor from gaining the advantage of ben-
efits from third parties in the form of reduced liability for
25. Ashley v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 19 Wis. 2d 17, 119 N.W.2d 359 (1963);
Prunty v. Vandenberg, 257 Wis. 469, 44 N.W.2d 246 (1950); Cunnien v. Superior Iron
Works Co., 175 Wis. 172, 184 N.W. 767 (1921).
26. Thoreson v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Corp., 56 Wis. 2d 231, 243-45, 201
N.W.2d 745, 751-52 (1972); McLaughlin v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R.R., 31 Wis. 2d
378, 395-96, 143 N.W.2d 32, 40-41 (1966).
27. Thoreson, 56 Wis. 2d at 243, 201 N.W.2d at 752.
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damages. 2 To accomplish these goals, the collateral source
rule requires that benefits which reduce or diminish the
amount of loss the plaintiff sustains as a result of the defend-
ant's tort be disregarded in determining the harm the defend-
ant has caused.
If damages awarded to restore a loss of earnings are mea-
sured by the plaintiff's after-tax earnings, then the collateral
source rule is inapplicable to the plaintiff's damages. The col-
lateral source rule is applicable only to benefits conferred
upon the plaintiff which restore or diminish loss the plaintiff
would have otherwise sustained as a result of the defendant's
wrongful conduct. The exemption of damages from taxation
is not a benefit that restores income the plaintiff has lost as a
result of the defendant's tort. It also is not a benefit (like gra-
tuitous medical services) that diminishes a cost the plaintiff
otherwise would not have incurred absent the tortfeasor's
wrongful act. The opposite is true of income taxes on earn-
ings. They would have been incurred if the defendant's tort
had never been committed. The tax exemption is therefore
distinguishable from benefits and payments that fall within the
scope of the collateral source rule. The tax exemption of dam-
ages simply ensures that when the plaintiff's loss is restored
by the defendant's payment of damages, the plaintiff's recov-
ery is not diminished by the imposition of taxes on the award.
The only way the tax exemption of damages can fall
within the scope of the collateral source rule is if the tax ex-
emption is a benefit which, when taken into account in mea-
suring the defendant's liability, would reduce the amount of
damages the defendant would have to pay to the plaintiff.
However, for the tax exemption to confer such a benefit, the
defendant must be required to pay damages for loss of earn-
ings measured by the plaintiff's gross earnings. If gross earn-
ings are the required measure of the plaintiff's loss of
earnings, then permitting the defendant to reduce liability by
the tax benefit the exemption confers upon the plaintiff would
shift the advantage of the tax exemption from the plaintiff to
the defendant. The reduction also would diminish the amount
28. Id.; see also Note, Unreason in the Law of Damages: The Collateral Source
Rule, 77 HARV. L. REv. 741 (1964).
[Vol. 70:210
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of loss which burdens the defendant. The collateral source
rule would therefore prohibit the reduction.
However, the tax exemption of damages can only confer a
benefit upon the plaintiff which falls within the scope of the
collateral source rule if the damages to be awarded to the
plaintiff are measured by the plaintiff's gross earnings. Thus,
if Congress enacted the tax exemption for personal injury
damages in order to confer a benefit on plaintiffs in the form
of increased awards of damages, then it must also be assumed
that Congress enacted the tax exemption to mandate that
damage awards replacing loss of earnings must be measured
by gross earnings. If this were the correct interpretation of
the purpose of the tax exemption statute, then the tax exemp-
tion extracts a "tax" from the defendant in the form of in-
creased liability and awards the revenue raised by the
exemption to the plaintiff. If Congress did not enact the ex-
emption for damages to confer the benefit of additional dam-
ages on the plaintiff, then the court is free to measure the
plaintiff's loss of earnings by the after-tax earnings. The only
"benefit" the plaintiff loses when he is awarded damages
which approximates his loss of past and prospective after-tax
earnings is the windfall that results when the defendant is re-
quired to pay damages which place the plaintiff in a better
position than he would have been in if he had never been in-
jured. If the tax-exemption of personal injury recoveries cre-
ates a benefit, it is a benefit that the plaintiff realizes only by
virtue of the defendant's payment of damages.
C. Congressional Intent
The second reason adopted for the Wisconsin rule is that
reducing the amount of damages awarded to the plaintiff by
the plaintiff's tax savings would nullify Congress' intent to
confer a tax benefit on injured parties. This tax benefit ap-
proximates the amount of taxes the plaintiff would have paid
on his earnings if he had received them in the normal course
of his employment.29
This reasoning is an interpretation of federal tax law. Spe-
cifically, if the purpose of the income tax exemption of per-
29. Hardware Mut., 6 Wis. 2d at 407, 94 N.W.2d at 582-83.
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sonal injury damages is interpreted as mandating that gross
earnings be used to measure recoveries for loss of earnings,
then the plaintiff will receive a tax benefit that approximates
the amount of tax he would have paid if his stream of earnings
had not been terminated or diminished by the defendant's
tort.
The amount of tax benefit the plaintiff derives from the tax
exemption of damages necessarily depends upon how the
damages are measured. Only damages measured by gross
earnings will yield a tax benefit which approximates the
amount of tax that would have been paid if no loss of earnings
had been sustained. Therefore, assuming that Congress in-
tended to confer a tax benefit on a plaintiff that approximates
the amount of tax the plaintiff would have paid on gross earn-
ings, Congress also must have intended to mandate that gross
earnings be used to measure damages awarded to a plaintiff
who sustains a loss of earnings as a result of injuries inflicted.
III. THE WISCONSIN RULE HAS LOST ITS RATIONALE
In 1980, the United States Supreme Court ended the con-
troversy regarding whether federal tax law requires gross
earnings to be used in measuring damages based on lost earn-
ings. In Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Liepelt,30 the
Supreme Court rejected the contention that the exclusion for
personal injury damages was enacted to confer a benefit on
tort victims thereby requiring that gross earnings be used to
measure damages awarded to restore losses of past and future
earnings. The Court held that after-tax earnings must be used
in calculating damages awarded for wrongful death in Federal
Employers LiabilityAct (FELA) cases. 1
Three years later, relying on the Liepelt decision, the
Court in Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer,32 held that
after-tax earnings must be used to measure loss of earnings in
negligence actions brought under the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.33
30. 444 U.S. 490 (1980).
31. Id. at 493-94. The text of the FELA is found at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982).
32. 462 U.S. 523 (1983). In Pfeifer, the Court also held that an after-tax interest
rate must be used in discounting the award to its present value. Id. at 536-38.
33. 33 U.S.C.A. § 905 (West 1986).
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In Liepelt, the Supreme Court's ruling that Congress has
not required that gross earnings be used to measure damages
based on loss of earnings is only a footnote in response to the
dissenting opinion.3" However, it is an important footnote for
courts which previously felt compelled to award damages
measured by gross earnings in order to preserve tax benefits
they thought Congress intended to confer on plaintiffs. The
Liepelt decision now permits courts to consider, without the
restraint previously believed to be imposed by federal tax law,
whether independent state law grounds justify continuing the
practice of awarding loss of earnings damages measured by
gross earnings. Indeed, jurisdictions like Wisconsin whose de-
cisions have been based solely on a now unfounded interpreta-
tion of federal tax law should consider this matter anew.
A. The Dissenting Opinion
Although it may seem odd to consider a dissenting opinion
before the majority opinion, the dissenting opinion in Liepelt
is instructive because it develops the interpretation of the fed-
eral tax exclusion for personal injury damages that the major-
ity opinion summarily rejects. The dissenting opinion
suggests that damages for loss of earnings must be measured
by gross earnings, reasoning that Congress has bestowed a
benefit on tort victims by choosing not to tax damage
awards. 35 The dissent reaches this conclusion by focusing on
the tax exemption rather than on the purpose the damage
award is to accomplish. In doing so, the dissent's reasoning
necessarily becomes somewhat circular: loss of earnings must
be measured by gross earnings because the tax exemption of
damages is intended to confer a benefit on tort victims, and in
order for the tax exemption to result in a benefit for the tort
victim, gross earnings must be used to measure the tort vic-
tim's loss.
The dissent acknowledges that Congress has not articu-
lated its reasons for enacting the exclusion for damages; how-
ever, the dissent reasons that since it is unlikely that Congress
enacted the exemption to benefit tortfeasors, Congress must
have had some other purpose in mind. The dissent finds two
34. Liepelt, 444 U.S.at 496 n.10.
35. Id. at 500-02 (Blackmun, L, dissenting).
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probable reasons which favor the tort victim's position that
loss of earnings must be measured by gross earnings.36
First, the dissent supposes that Congress might have en-
acted the exemption because taxing damages awarded for lost
earnings would involve the same complexity which many
courts note as a reason for not taking taxes into account in
measuring damage awards. The dissent assumes that if Con-
gress were to tax damages, it would have to enact a special
statute that would impose a tax on the award approximating
the amount of tax that would have been paid on the victim's
income if it had been earned over a period of time.37 Thus, the
dissent concludes, if Congress decided it was not worth the
effort to estimate the prospective tax liability on behalf of the
public fisc, then Congress would not require such an estimate
for the benefit of the tortfeasor.3 s
This reasoning would not be applicable to claims brought
under state law. Even the dissent "would not infer a congres-
sional purpose to override the States' traditional power to de-
fine the measure of damages applicable to state-created causes
of action." 39 Thus, if this were the sole reason for enacting the
exclusion for damages, states could not rely on congressional
intent as a basis for using gross earnings to measure loss of
earnings awards.4°
Second, the dissent assumes that Congress might have in-
tended to confer a humanitarian benefit on the tort victim,
reasoning that the exemption diminishes the victim's chances
of needing public relief.4 However, if the tort victim is com-
pensated for his loss in damages that restore him to the same
economic position he would have been in if the tortfeasor's
wrong had not been committed, then there should be little
36. Id. at 501.
37. Id. The assumption the dissent makes is quite plausible because the tax rate
that would be applicable to the lump sum award, if taxed, could greatly exceed the tax
rate that would have applied to the victim's incremental earnings. See I.R.C. § 1 (1986).
38. Liepelt, 444 U.S. at 502 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 500-01 n.3.
40. In contrast, if the Court had found that Congress enacted the damages exclu-
sion to confer a benefit on plaintiffs, state courts following the collateral source rule
would use a gross earnings measure, not because Congress mandated its use, but be-
cause an independent state rule requires that the intended benefit be preserved for the
plaintiff.
41. Liepelt, 444 U.S. at 501 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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chance that the victim will become a public charge. If there is
such a chance, it should be no greater than it would have been
had the defendant's tortious conduct never occurred. More-
over, in order for the exemption to confer an economic benefit
on the victim, the defendant must pay damages. Unlike a de-
duction which might generate tax savings by offsetting income
the victim has from one or more sources, a tax exemption only
benefits the victim to the extent that the victim receives in-
come from a source that falls within the exclusion.42
B. The Majority's Response
The majority opinion tersely addresses the points made by
the dissent. First, the majority notes that there is nothing in
the language or legislative history of the damages exemption
to suggest that it has any impact on the proper measure of
damages.43 Second, the majority holds that netting out taxes
which would have been paid on earnings had they been re-
ceived in the normal course of employment, just like netting
out a wrongful death victim's personal expenditures, is neces-
sary to arrive at the pecuniary benefits the plaintiff is entitled
to recover in damages. 44 Thus, the majority opinion focuses
primarily on the proper measure of damages and only secon-
darily on how income taxes relate to that measure. The Court
stated:
In a wrongful death action under the FELA the measure of
recovery is "the damages... [that] flow from the depriva-
tion of the pecuniary benefits which the beneficiaries might
have reasonably received .... " Michigan Central R. Co. v.
Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 70 (1913). The amount of money
that a wage earner is able to contribute to the support of his
family is unquestionably affected by the amount of the tax he
must pay to the Federal Government. It is his after-tax in-
come, rather than his gross income before taxes, that pro-
vides the only realistic measure of his ability to support his
42. A third possibility which the dissent does not acknowledge is that Congress
might have enacted the exemption to ensure that when the victim receives an award of
damages, which the judiciary determines will fully compensate his loss, the victim will
not ultimately be undercompensated as a result of taxes imposed on the award and the
prevailing practice of excluding evidence of payments the victim will be required to
make from the award.
43. Liepelt, 444 U.S. at 496 n.10.
44. Id.
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family. It follows inexorably that the wage earner's income
tax is a relevant factor in calculating the monetary loss suf-
fered by his dependents when he dies.45
The balance of the Liepelt opinion addresses the relation-
ship between the Federal Rules of Evidence and the admissi-
bility of evidence of taxes that would have been paid on the
plaintiff's earnings if no tort had been committed.
C. Federal Rules of Evidence
In Liepelt, the Supreme Court also held that evidence
describing the victim's estimated after-tax earnings is not too
speculative or complex to be presented to the jury. The Court
acknowledged that variables such as changes in the tax laws,
the decedent's family size, his spouse's earnings, and extra in-
come or unforeseen deductions may affect the wage-earner's
future income tax liability and require estimates and predic-
tions. However, the Court noted that matters such as future
employment, health, personal expenditures, interest rates and
inflation also require estimation and prediction. The Court
reasoned that since the trial bar and bench have developed
effective methods of presenting the latter matters in a form
understandable by juries, the same will be true with respect to
taxation matters.46 However, the Court also noted that if the
impact of future income tax in calculating the award would be
de minimus, the evidence may be omitted because the confu-
sion it might cause would outweigh its relevance.47
Next the Court addressed the plaintiff's contention that if
evidence of income taxes the plaintiff would have paid is rele-
vant, then other equally relevant evidence, including the tax
on income earned on the damage award and the plaintiff's at-
torney's fees, would also be admissible. The Court pointed
out that even though evidence of future taxes on earnings
from the award would be admissible, this is no reason to reject
tax evidence for purposes of measuring lost earnings. 48 How-
ever, evidence of attorney's fees, the Court stated, is not rele-
vant since in FELA actions there is no statutory authority for
45. Id. at 493-94.
46. Id. at 494.
47. Id. at 494-95 n.7.
48. Id. at 495.
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awarding attorney's fees to the successful litigant. It would
also be improper to offset what may be regarded as an unfair
or undesirable rule regarding attorney's fees by ignoring the
"demonstrably relevant factor of income tax in measuring
damages. '49
In summary, Liepelt and the Court's subsequent decision
in Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer 5 1 establish that for
federal claims, after-tax earnings must be used in calculating
personal injury awards for loss of earnings and pecuniary loss
awards in wrongful death actions."
Moreover, Liepelt establishes that Congress did not intend
to confer a benefit on injured parties by exempting personal
injury awards from taxation. Therefore, state court decisions
requiring that gross earnings be used to measure loss of earn-
ings are now unfounded to the extent that they are based on
an interpretation of section 104 of the Internal Revenue Code
which contradicts Liepelt. However, state courts may still
exclude tax evidence if the exclusion is proper under the
state's own evidentiary rules.52
IV. OTHER RATIONALES FOR EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OF
FUTURE INCOME TAXES
The Wisconsin rule that damages based on loss of earnings
are to be calculated without deduction of income taxes is ripe
for reconsideration because it is premised on the now un-
founded interpretation of federal law that Congress intended
to confer a benefit on plaintiffs by exempting personal injury
49. Id. at 495-96.
50. 462 U.S. 523 (1983).
51. See also Fanetti v. Hellenic Lines Ltd., 678 F.2d 424, 431 (2d Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 463 U.S. 1206 (1983).
The Court has left open the question of whether the holding in Liepelt would control
when a federal claim incorporates state law. Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453
U.S. 473, 487-88 (1981). Several appellate courts have held that it does not. Hansen v.
Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 734 F.2d 1036, 1045 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S.
1051 (1985); In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, III., 701 F.2d 1189, 1193 (7th Cir.
1983); Vasina v. Grumman Corp., 644 F.2d 112, 118 (2d Cir. 1981); Croce v. Bromley
Corp., 623 F.2d 1084, 1096-97 (5th Cir. 1980); Psychiatric Inst. of Wash. v. Allen, 509
A.2d 619, 626-27 (D.C. 1986).
52. When grounds for a state law are dependent on federal law, a federal question is
presented. If that question is decided contrary to a state court ruling, the state court
must provide independent state grounds for its ruling to be sustained. See Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 568 (1977).
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and wrongful death awards from taxation. No such benefit
was intended and thus, the Wisconsin rule has lost its
rationale.
If the Wisconsin Supreme Court chooses to continue ap-
plying the current rule,53 it must furnish a new rationale based
on the state's own evidentiary rules. However, the possibili-
ties are contrary to other case law in Wisconsin.
A. Evidence of Future Taxes is Too Speculative
One rationale which could be adopted to support contin-
ued application of the Wisconsin rule is that evidence of fu-
ture taxes is too speculative or conjectural to be admitted.
Several courts have adopted this rationale, finding that there
are too many variables that might affect the plaintiff's future
tax liability, including changes in the tax rates and exclusions,
exemptions and deductions to which the tort victim might be
entitled. 4
Courts that have rejected this rationale acknowledge that
future taxes are uncertain, but they also find that other fac-
tors, such as the possibility of future employment and life ex-
pectancy, are just as unpredictable." Moreover, it would be
unjust to allow the plaintiff to introduce uncertain evidence as
to his earning capacity, but cut off any attempt by the defend-
ant to show that those earnings would have been taxed. Pro-
fessor Nordstrom summarized this position succinctly in his
1958 article when he wrote:
53. Several courts have held that the federal rule admitting evidence of income
taxes the plaintiff would have paid is inapplicable to state law claims. See, e.g., Irwin v.
Pacific S.W. Airlines, 133 Cal. App. 3d 709, 717-18, 184 Cal. Rptr. 228, 231-32 (1982);
Psychiatric Inst. of Wash. v. Allen, 509 A.2d 619, 626 (D.C. 1986); McCann v. Lisle-
Woodridge Fire Protection Dist., 115 Ill. App. 3d 702, -, 450 N.E.2d 1311, 1314
(1983); Richardson v. LaBuz, 81 Pa. Commw. 436, -, 474 A.2d 1181, 1197 (1984);
Bingaman v. Grays Harbor Community Hosp., 37 Wash. App. 825, 685 P.2d 1090
(1984), rev'd on other grounds, 103 Wash. 2d 831, 699 P.2d 1230 (1985); Maicke v.
RDH, Inc., 37 Wash. App. 750, 683 P.2d 227 (1984).
54. See, e.g., Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co., 510 F.2d 234, 236-37 (5th Cir. 1975);
McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 35-37 (2d Cir. 1960); Stokes v.
United States, 144 F.2d 82, 87 (2d Cir. 1944); Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, -,
251 S.W.2d 42, 46 (1952); Dehn v. Prouty, 321 N.W.2d 534, 535 (S.D. 1982).
55. See, e.g., Hooks v. Washington Sheraton Corp., 578 F.2d 313, 317 (D.C. Cir.
1977); Burlington N., Inc. v. Boxberger, 529 F.2d 284, 293 (9th Cir. 1975); O'Connor v.
United States, 269 F.2d 578, 584 (2d Cir. 1959); Floyd v. Fruit Indus., 144 Conn. 659,
-, 136 A.2d 918, 925-26 (1957).
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Indeed, which is more conjectural: the existence of income
tax in this country along the pattern that we now know it, or
the continuance of the plaintiff's salary during exactly the
same period? ... If the plaintiff receives the advantage of
the speculation in his favor, why do we bar the defendant
from even trying to show what appears to be a smaller spec-
ulation in his favor?56
With the national debt in excess of two trillion dollars,5 these
questions are even more pertinent today. The existence of the
income tax in the future is a virtual certainty.
In Wisconsin, trial courts allow evidence of impaired fu-
ture earning capacity that is more speculative and uncertain
than would be admissible for proof of historical facts. 8 The
Wisconsin Supreme Court has recognized that "[m]any ele-
ments that go to a determination of impairment [of earning]
capacity cannot be proven with certainty. ' 59 However, Wis-
consin has made a policy decision that "the ends of justice will
be furthered by recognizing the probabilities in respect to the
computation of future damages." 60 A policy decision such as
this would not permit one party to a lawsuit the advantage of
evidence based on estimations, while prohibiting the use of
similar evidence by the other party.
Another indication that Wisconsin would not adopt the
"too speculative" rationale is apparent in Hardware Mutual
Casualty Co. v. Harry Crow & Son,61 the Wisconsin Supreme
Court decision which enunciated the gross earnings rule. In
Hardware Mutual, the court only quotes the Illinois Supreme
Court's rationale that no reduction is to be made because Con-
gress intended to confer a benefit on plaintiffs by exempting
personal injury awards from taxation.6 2 However, in the Illi-
nois decision relied upon, the court also stated that "[w]e are
56. Nordstrom, supra note 10, at 227.
57. 44 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2588 (Oct. 18, 1986).
58. Fischer v. Cleveland Punch & Shear Works Co., 91 Wis. 2d 85, 100, 280
N.W.2d 280, 287 (1979); Brain v. Mann, 129 Wis. 2d 447, 459, 385 N.W.2d 227, 232
(Ct. App. 1986).
59. Reinke v. Woltjen, 32 Wis. 2d 653, 660, 146 N.W.2d 493, 497 (1966).
60. McCrossen v. Nekoosa Edwards Paper Co., 59 Wis. 2d 245, 262, 208 N.W.2d
148, 158 (1973).
61. 6 Wis.2d 396, 94 N.W.2d 577 (1959).
62. Id. at 407, 94 N.W.2d at 582-83 (quoting Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 Ill. 2d
135, 151, 125 N.E.2d 77, 86 (1955)).
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of the opinion that the incident of taxation is not a proper
factor for a jury's consideration.... It introduces an extrane-
ous subject, giving rise to conjecture and speculation."63 The
absence of this reasoning from the Wisconsin decision indi-
cates that it is not persuasive and would not be adopted now.
Even if Wisconsin decided inconsistently that evidence of
income taxes is too speculative to be admitted, the ruling
would have to be confined to evidence of future taxes. As to
earnings lost up to the time of trial, the taxes which would
have been payable on those earnings had the plaintiff not been
injured can be calculated with near precision. The Alaska
Supreme Court has limited its exclusionary rule to income
taxes relating to future damages. 64 While perhaps logical, this
rule would invite jury confusion since the jury would be re-
quired to utilize different rules to measure past and future
losses.
B. Complexity and Confusion
Another related rationale Wisconsin could adopt is that
computation of a plaintiff's hypothetical tax liability is too
complex for the jury and would impair the jury's competence
to decide issues of fact.65 In reducing the award to its present
value, the jury would also have to take into account taxability
of income earned from investing the award. 6
However, jury confusion can be reduced to a minimum by
the use of expert testimony, and most jurors today have some
personal experience in determining their own tax liability. 67
Expert testimony is already required in Wisconsin to support
63. Hall, 5 Ill. 2d at 151, 125 N.E.2d at 86.
64. Yukon Equip., Inc. v. Gordon, 660 P.2d 428, 434-35 (Alaska 1983).
65. Wis. STAT. § 904.03 (1985-86) provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair preju-
dice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue de-
lay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." See Domeracki v.
Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 443 F.2d 1245, 1250-51 (3d Cir. 1971); McWeeney v. New
York, N.H. & H.R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1960); Dehn v. Prouty, 321 N.W.2d
534, 539 (S.D. 1982).
66. Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co., 510 F.2d 234, 236-37 (5th Cir. 1975);
McWeeney, 282 F.2d at 37; Louissaint v. Hudson Waterways Corp., 111 Misc. 2d 122,
-, 443 N.Y.S.2d 678, 682 (Sup. Ct. 1981).
67. Hooks v. Washington Sheraton Corp., 578 F.2d 313, 317 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Bur-
lington N., Inc. v. Boxberger, 529 F.2d 284, 293 (9th Cir. 1975).
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an award for loss of earning capacity. 8 Additionally, as long
as the expert is qualified, expert testimony is ordinarily admis-
sible irrespective of the underlying theory on which the testi-
mony is based. 9
This rationale also has little force where a court is sitting
without a jury.70  Presumably, trial judges would not deter-
mine that they are also incapable of making the required tax
computations even with the aid of expert testimony, although
some have.7 1 Moreover, the Tax Reform Act of 198672 has
greatly simplified the computation of tax liabilities for most
taxpayers.
C. Offset of Inflation and Attorney's Fees
Other courts refuse to reduce the plaintiff's earnings by
hypothetical taxes because inaccuracies resulting from failure
to make the reduction are offset by ignoring inflation in calcu-
lating future earnings and refusing to award the prevailing
plaintiff attorney's fees.73 This rationale is not supported by
the Wisconsin case law relating to evidence of inflation and
attorney's fees.
In Wisconsin, inflation is taken into account in determin-
ing damages for future loss.7 4 Therefore, this rationale would
be inapplicable in Wisconsin because of its erroneous prem-
68. Koele v. Radue, 81 Wis. 2d 583, 590, 260 N.W.2d 766, 769 (1978); Brain v.
Mann, 129 Wis. 2d 447, 458, 385 N.W.2d 227, 232 (Ct. App. 1986).
69. State v. Walstad, 119 Wis. 2d 483, 518, 351 N.W.2d 469,487 (1984); Brain, 129
Wis. 2d at 459, 385 N.W.2d at 233-34 (allowing expert testimony as to loss of earnings
based on statistical surveys); Klingman v. Kruschke, 115 Wis. 2d 124, 126-28, 339
N.W.2d 603, 604-05 (Ct. App. 1983) (allowing vocational rehabilitation expert's opin-
ion testimony based on data which the expert testified was the type of data reasonably
relied upon by vocational rehabilitation experts to evaluate occupational disabilities).
70. Downs v. United States, 522 F.2d 990, 1005 (6th Cir. 1975).
71. See, e.g., Frankel v. United States., 321 F. Supp. 1331, 1348-49 (E.D. Pa. 1970),
aff'd, 466 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1972).
72. Pub. L. No. 99-514 (1986).
73. See, e.g., McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir.
1960).
74. Cords v. Anderson, 80 Wis. 2d 525, 550-52, 259 N.W.2d 672, 683-85 (1977);
Maskrey v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 125 Wis. 2d 145, 167-68, 370 N.W.2d
815, 826 (Ct. App. 1985); see also Comment, Future Inflation: A New Element of Dam-
ages in Wisconsin, 61 MARQ. L. REv. 620 (1978); Comment, Adjusting Damage Awards
for Future Inflation, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 397. For an excellent discussion of methods of
accounting for inflation in measuring damages, see Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v.
Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523, 538-52 (1983).
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ise.75 Using gross earnings, rather than earnings net of income
taxes, would not offset any failure to take inflation into ac-
count. Instead, the plaintiff would receive a windfall.
With respect to attorney's fees, courts have reasoned that
any overcompensation the plaintiff receives because the award
for lost earnings is not reduced by taxes is offset by the fact
that the plaintiff does not receive the entire award because he
must pay his attorney.76 This rationale acknowledges that the
gross earnings rule overcompensates the plaintiff but ignores
the fact that the defendant's liability is measured by loss re-
sulting from the defendant's tortious conduct. The plaintiff
must pay his attorney because of a contractual obligation
owed to the attorney. Attorney's fees are therefore irrelevant
to the measure of the plaintiff's damages. No one would
doubt that if the plaintiff offered direct evidence of his attor-
ney's fees, the evidence would be rejected."
Moreover, Wisconsin continues to follow the "American
rule" that a prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to col-
lect attorney's fees from the opposing party as part of damages
or costs. 78 Adopting the rationale that any overcompensation
the plaintiff receives is offset by his attorney's fees would indi-
rectly change this rule. As the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals noted, the rule should not be changed under the guise
of judicial opinion excluding tax evidence; "it should be a step
taken consciously by the legislature."7 9 If Wisconsin chooses
to no longer follow the "American rule," certainly the new
rule should be equally advantageous to all tort victims, not
just those who sustain a substantial loss of eanings.
75. See Hooks v. Washington Sheraton Corp., 578 F.2d 313, 318 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(noting inapplicability of this rationale where evidence of inflation is admissible); Bur-
lington N., Inc. v. Boxberger, 529 F.2d 284, 293 (9th Cir. 1975) (noting inapplicability
of this rationale where evidence of inflation is admissible).
76. See, e.g., McWeeney, 282 F.2d at 38; Louissaint v. Hudson Waterways Corp.,
111 Misc. 2d 122, -, 443 N.Y.S.2d 678, 682-83 (Sup. Ct. 1981).
77. Burlington N., 529 F.2d at 294.
78. Watkins v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 117 Wis. 2d 753, 758, 345
N.W.2d 482, 485 (1984). Attorney's fees are recoverable as damages only where recov-
ery is authorized by contractual or statutory provisions, Cedarburg Light & Water
Comm'n v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 42 Wis. 2d 120, 124-25, 166 N.W.2d 165, 167 (1969),
or where attorney's fees are incurred through litigation with other parties resulting from
a wrongful act by the opponent in the case where attorney's fees are sought. Kohlenberg
v. American Plumbing Supply Co., 82 Wis. 2d 384, 399, 263 N.W.2d 496, 503 (1978).
79. Hooks, 578 F.2d at 318.
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D. Wrongful Death Actions
In wrongful death actions, none of the alternative ratio-
nales for the Wisconsin rule justifies allowing recoveries for
deprivation of support and property accumulations based on
lost future earnings without reduction for income taxes. Each
rationale excludes evidence of future taxes, not because they
are additional damages the plaintiff is entitled to recover, but
because the future taxes are too speculative or complex, or
offset the failure to take into account inflation or attorney's
fees.
Wrongful death actions are purely statutory.80 The pur-
pose of the statute is "to compensate survivors for the pecuni-
ary benefits which they would have derived from the earning
power of the decedent had he or she lived. '8 1 The survivors
are not entitled to recover the deceased's earnings. Only the
value of the support and pecuniary benefit they probably
would have received from the deceased plus sums the survi-
vors would have ultimately received from reasonably certain
future earnings the deceased would have accumulated are re-
coverable.8 2 Outlays the deceased would have made for his
own support and incidentals must be taken into account in
measuring the survivors' award. 3
It necessarily follows that taxes the deceased would have
paid also reduce the amount of support the deceased could
have provided and the amount of earnings he could have ac-
cumulated had he lived. The Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals summarized this reasoning when it wrote:
The deceased's beneficiaries could not logically and reason-
ably have expected to receive the money he would have paid
in such taxes had he lived. Only the net income would have
been available for their support. And there can be no pecu-
80. Weiss v. Regent Properties, Ltd., 118 Wis. 2d 225, 230, 346 N.W.2d 766, 768
(1984); Krantz v. Harris, 40 Wis. 2d 709, 714, 162 N.W.2d 628, 630 (1968); see also
Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 895.03-04 (West 1983 & Supp. 1986).
81. Weiss, 118 Wis. 2d at 230, 346 N.W.2d at 768; Nichols v. United States Fidel-
ity & Guar. Co., 13 Wis. 2d 491, 497, 109 N.W.2d 131, 135 (1961).
82. Neuser v. Thelen, 209 Wis. 262, 268, 244 N.W. 801, 803 (1932).
83. Maloney v. Wisconsin Power, Light & Heat Co., 180 Wis. 546, 550, 193 N.W.
399, 400 (1923); Sadowski v. Thomas Furnace Co., 157 Wis. 443, 454, 146 N.W. 770,
774-75 (1914).
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niary loss of income which would not have been available for
contribution. 84
Additionally, punitive damages are not recoverable under
Wisconsin's wrongful death statute.8 5 If taxes the deceased
would have paid are not deducted in determining the survi-
vor's award, the survivor will be overcompensated. Damages
awarded in excess of the survivor's compensatory loss could
be considered punitive. 6
Therefore, in wrongful death actions, recoveries for pecu-
niary loss which result from deprivation of income the de-
ceased would have earned from employment should be
measured by the deceased's projected earnings net of esti-
mated income taxes.
V. PROPOSAL
The Wisconsin rule excluding evidence of taxes a tort vic-
tim would have paid if the victim had not sustained a loss of
earnings should be reconsidered because the rationale for the
rule is based on a now unfounded interpretation of federal tax
law. Since other rationales which might justify continued ap-
plication of this rule are all inconsistent with other Wisconsin
case law, the Wisconsin Supreme Court should rule that evi-
dence of taxes that would have been paid on loss of earnings is
relevant, admissible evidence. The new rule should be appli-
cable to loss of past and prospective earnings and earning ca-
pacity. It should also apply to wrongful death recoveries for
loss of support and property accumulations that would have
been derived from the deceased's employment earnings.
The court should also rule that the standards applicable to
proof of loss of future earnings also apply to proof of taxes
that would have been paid on those earnings. The court has
stated in this regard:
84. Cox v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 379 F.2d 893, 896 (7th Cir. 1967); see also
Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 493-94 (1980); O'Connor v. United States,
269 F.2d 578, 584-85 (2d Cir. 1959); Gilliard v. New York City Health and Hosp., Inc.,
77 A.D.2d 532, -, 430 N.Y.S.2d 308, 309 (1980); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Sutton,
208 Okla. 488, _257 P.2d 307, 316 (1953).
85. Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 314-15, 294 N.W.2d 437, 464-65
(1980).
86. White v. Benkowski, 37 Wis. 2d 285, 290-91, 155 N.W.2d 74, 76-77 (1967).
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In determining damages to be awarded for impairment of
earning capacity or loss of future earnings, in most instances,
the finder of the fact must deal in some probabilities. In the
case where the claimant is totally [and] permanently dis-
abled from engaging in any gainful employment or activities
his impairment of earning capacity can be calculated with a
substantial degree of certainty .... Many elements that go
to a determination of impairment capacity cannot be proven
with certainty. Proof of these elements must be permitted by
facts or inferences that lead to reasonable probabilities.
Some (but not all) of the elements which cannot always be
shown with certainty are the length of time a disability will
exist, the degree of improvement or additional disability that
will ensue, the aptitude and ability of a disabled person to
engage in other types of work, and the compensation he will
be able to obtain. As to these and other uncertain elements
the trier of fact must be allowed to consider the reasonably
apparent probabilities as they appear from the evidence, to-
gether with such known facts as his age, his education and
training, the type work [sic] he was doing before the injury,
and the compensation he was receiving, and then in its judg-
ment determine what amount fairly and reasonably repre-
sents his loss of earning capacity, reduced to its present
value.8
7
Although the court states that the amount of earnings lost
as a result of a permanent and total disability can be deter-
mined with a substantial degree of certainty, the determina-
tion of the amount of loss is by no means exact. Probabilities
must still be taken into account such as the life expectancy of
the victim, continuance of employment, and possible increases
and decreases in compensation that the victim would have re-
ceived if he had not been injured. Where the victim suffers
impairment of his earning capacity, additional variables must
also be taken into account in measuring the award. The same
variables affect the amount of tax that the victim would have
paid on the earnings if the victim had not been injured. In-
creases and decreases in compensation the victim might have
received are estimations just like increases and decreases in
taxes that would have been paid on such compensation. Since
mathematical certainty is not required in projecting loss of
87. Reinke v. Woltjen, 32 Wis. 2d 653, 660, 146 N.W.2d 493, 497 (1966).
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earnings, it should not be required in projecting the amount of
tax that would have been paid on those earnings. Proof of
taxes which would have been payable on earnings lost as of
the time of trial should be substantially certain since the tax
rate that would have applied to those earnings and other facts
relevant to the plaintiff's tax liability will be known.
With respect to future earnings, proof of taxes which
would have been payable on those earnings can be raised by
inference from (1) the percentage of earnings the plaintiff paid
in taxes or the amount of tax paid in past years; 88 (2) the tax
rates applicable at the time of trial;8 9 or (3) evidence of future
tax rates, if available. 90 The same tax rate schedule would also
be applicable for purposes of determining the after-tax dis-
count rate to be used in reducing the award to its present
value.91 In most, if not all, cases, expert testimony may be elic-
ited to assist the jury in determining the amount of tax that
would have been imposed on the victim's earnings. In other
cases, the plaintiff's testimony on direct and cross-examina-
tion as to past tax liabilities may suffice.
Regardless of whether past, present or future tax rates are
used to measure the tax reduction, the reduction should ap-
proximate the amount of tax that would have been paid on the
victim's annual earnings received over time rather than the
amount of tax that would be payable if lump sum damage
awards were taxed. The tax rate applicable to a lump sum
award should not be used because it will exceed the tax rate
applicable to smaller incremental earnings received over
time. 92 If the victim's loss of earnings represents his total in-
come, the tax reduction can be computed by using the rate
88. Fanetti v. Hellenic Lines Ltd., 678 F.2d 424, 432 (2d Cir. 1982). If past taxes
are used to estimate future taxes, an adjustment must be made in the year the plaintiff
was injured if that year does not reflect an entire year of earnings. Id. at 432 n.8.
89. See Cox v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 379 F.2d 893, 896 (7th Cir. 1967) (adopt-
ing this approach); O'Connor v. United States, 269 F.2d 578, 584 (2d Cir. 1959) (adopt-
ing this approach).
90. Fanetti, 678 F.2d at 432. At the risk of sounding naive, counsel might also
stipulate as to the amount of future taxes.
91. An after-tax discount rate is determined by multiplying the discount rate which
would be applicable if no tax were imposed on income generated from investment of the
award by the difference between one and the effective tax rate which will be applicable
to the earnings. For example, if the pre-tax discount rate is 5% and the tax rate is 15%,
the after tax discount rate is 4.25%.
92. See I.R.C. § 1 (1986).
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schedule that would have been applicable if the earnings had
been received in the normal course of employment. 93 How-
ever, if the victim is expected to have, or in a wrongful death
case would have had, income from a source other than the
victim's own labor, these other sources of income must be
taken into account to determine the average (effective) tax rate
that would have applied to all sources of earnings. The aver-
age tax rate is determined by dividing the total tax on all
sources of income by the amount of such income. The effec-
tive rate is lower than the top marginal rate.94
If this proposal is adopted, tax evidence will not necessar-
ily be introduced in every case where a recovery of lost earn-
ings is sought. Evidence of taxes could be excluded where the
facts indicate that even if the jury gave the plaintiff the highest
award which would be supported by the evidence, little or no
tax would be paid.95 For example, when the provisions of the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 are fully phased in, a married indi-
vidual with two dependent children would pay no taxes on
gross earnings of $13,000. The taxpayer would be entitled to
four exemptions of $2000 each 96 and a $5000 standard deduc-
tion.97 To alleviate the need for plaintiffs of lesser means to
hire a tax expert, perhaps the burden of proving that taxes
would have been payable on the plaintiff's earnings should be
placed on the defendant. The defendant would then introduce
tax evidence only if the plaintiff's projected tax liability ex-
ceeds the cost of discovering such evidence and the cost of
hiring a tax expert.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 has greatly simplified the
computation of tax liabilities for the average taxpayer. In-
stead of fifteen marginal tax rates potentially applicable to an
individual,98 there will be only two in 1988. 99 For a married
93. Id.
94. For example, assume that a victim's loss of earnings for one year is $10,000 and
during that year he also has $15,000 of taxable income from other sources. If the tax
rate applicable to the first $10,000 earned is 10% and the rate applicable to all income
exceeding $10,000 is 15%, then the victim would have paid $3250 in taxes. The vic-
tim's effective tax rate on income from all sources is 13%, determined by dividing the
total tax ($3250) by the victim's total income ($25,000).
95. See supra note 63 for text of Wis. STAT. § 904.03 (1985-86).
96. I.R.C. § 151 (1986).
97. Id. at § 63(c)(2)(A).
98. Id. at § 1 (1954 as amended in 1984).
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individual who files a joint return, the tax rate applicable to
taxable income which does not exceed $29,750 is fifteen per-
cent.10 For taxable income in excess of $29,750, the rate is
twenty-eight percent.101 Even if there is a possibility that
these rates will increase, it should not preclude the defendant
from showing that the plaintiff would have paid at least the
amount of tax computed using these rates. As stated by the
Connecticut Supreme Court:
It would be difficult to conceive of a more unjust, unrealistic
or unfair rule than one which would lead a jury to base their
allowance of reasonable compensation for the destruction of
earning capacity on the hypothesis that no income taxes
would be paid on net earnings. For all practical purposes,




The Wisconsin Supreme Court should overrule Hardware
Mutual Casualty Co. v. Harry Crow & Son, 0 3 and join the
United States Supreme Court in holding that the proper mea-
sure of loss of earnings in personal injury and wrongful death
actions is after-tax earnings. As stated by the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, reducing gross earnings by taxes the plain-
tiff would have paid "more accurately harmonizes with fair
economic reality, more justly achieves the goal of compensat-
ing claimants for the actual loss suffered, and safeguards
against the injustice of overcompensation."'" The net earn-
ings rule is the fair, logical and just approach."°5
99. Id. at § 1 (1986).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Floyd v. Fruit Indus., 144 Conn. 659, -, 136 A.2d 918, 925 (1957).
Although Floyd involved a wrongful death action, the court probably would have ap-
plied the same rule since the Connecticut wrongful death statute was a "survival-type"
statute pursuant to which the plaintiff recovers damages that approximate what the
deceased would have recovered had he lived. Id. at -, 136 A.2d at 929.
103. 6 Wis. 2d 396, 94 N.W.2d 577 (1959).
104. Burlington N., Inc. v. Boxberger, 529 F.2d 284, 298 (9th Cir. 1975).
105. Id. at 294.
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